

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W

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O R 210915Z MAY 76 ZFF4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 13032

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ALL NATO CAPITALS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: NATO MINISTERIAL: RESTRICTED SESSION, MORNING, MAY 20, 1976

1. SUMMARY. FOLLIWING INITIAL INTERVENTION BY THE SECRETARY, CANADIAN SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MACEACHEN AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER MADE THEIR INTERVENTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. CANADIAN SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MACEACHEN NOTED THE WEST WENT INTO CSCE WITH SOME MISGIVINGS, DOUBTING THAT A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF SECURITY OR HUMAN CONTACTS WOULD PRODUCE WORTHWHILE RESULTS. HOWEVER, THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT PROBABLY HAS MORE IN IT THAN THE WEST HOPED FOR. WHILE CSCE RESULTS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY SATISFACTORY, IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD ABANDON CSCE OR THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH. THE RUSSIANS HAVE HAD TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OF SOME SUBSTANCE, AND TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH CIRCUMSPECTION. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE WAY A COUNTRY TREATS ITS OWN PEOPLE CAN BE DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THE PROBLEM NOW IS HOW TO CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE EASTERN COMMITMENT TO CSCE.

WHILE THERE IS MERIT IN UTILIZING BILATERAL CHANNELS, IN A MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT THAT ENGAGES THE
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CREDIBILITY AND INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS

ALLIES IN A HIGH PROFILE MANNER, THE ALLIES CAN GO FURTHER TO COMPEL CONFORMITY TO PAST UNDERTAKINGS AND TO CALL FOR NEW STEPS.

WHEN THE USSR USES DETENTE, IT IS DEFINED IN SOVIET TERMS AND INTERPRETED FOR SOVIET ADVANTAGE. BUT, BECAUSE THEIR APPROACH IS DIFFERENT, WE SHOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ABANDON THE TERM WHICH HAS BEEN USED SO FREQUENTLY BY THIS COUNCIL AND AT HELSINKI. IF IT IS USEFUL IN GENERATING SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS, WE SHOULD EMPLOY IT TO OUR OWN ADVANTAGE. WE SHOULD NOT BE STAMPEDED INTO ABANDONING A TACTICALLY USEFUL POSITION BECAUSE OF A WORD. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE TERMS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS ASK US TO ACCEPT DETENTE AND THE LIMITATIONS THEY PLACE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF CSCE. IN BELGRADE IN 1977, WE MUST INSIST ON A MORE SATISFACTORY AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR OBJECTIVES. ONLY THUS CAN WE ENSURE THAT THE BROAD PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CSCE WILL BE APPLIED: AVOIDING CONFRONTATION, SEEKING MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION, COOPERATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND COEXISTENCE OF IDEAS.

THE EAST IS ASKING US TO ACCEPT A DOUBLE STANDARD SO THAT THE IMPERATIVES OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY WILL NOT BE IMPEDED: FOREIGN POLICY AS A CLASS POLICY; SOVIET PEACE POLICY DEFINED AS A POLICY OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM AND SOLIDARITY WITH (SOVIET-DEFINED) NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. THIS MEANS THAT NONE OF THE PRINCIPLES INHERENT IN ANY OF THE THREE BASKETS OF CSCE MAY PREVAIL OVER THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANY COUNTRY OR IN THE POWER STRUGGLES OF EMERGING STATES SUCH AS ANGOLA.

IF SUCH COMMENTS ARE ONLY RITUAL NODS IN THE DIRECTION OF OUTWORN LENINIST DOCTRINE, WE NEED NOT BE CONCERNED. BUT PROBLEMS ARISE WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO APPLY THIS POLICY. WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO REQUIRE THE EAST TO ABANDON ITS PHILOSOPHY, BUT IN AN ERA WHERE

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MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION AND COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CATASTROPHE, IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR A MAJOR PROTAGONIST TO SEEK ACTIVELY TO PUT SUCH DOCTRINES INTO EFFECT.

HERE IS A COMMON TASK FOR BELGRADE. WE MUST FOLLOW THE LEAD TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL

ALLIES MUST BE ASKED REPEATEDLY HOW INTERNATIONAL CLASS
WARFARE AND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR CERTAIN PARTIES IN
FOREIGN STATES (THAT IS, INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF A
CLASS OR PARTY) CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS ON WHICH THEY PUT
SUCH GREAT STRESS. IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE AT BELGRADE
TO LAY DOWN NEW PRINCIPLES IN THIS AREA, BUT THE VERY
PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION CAN HELP BY IMPRESSING OUR
CONCERN. AT BELGRADE WE MUST SEEK CONFIRMATION THAT THE
UNDERTAKINGS OF HELSINKI ARE BEING FOLLOWED AND WE SHOULD
ALSO BEGIN TO LOOK TOWARDS THE NEXT STEPS NECESSARY IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE DETENTE
PROCESS - ONE THAT IS FREE FROM IRRATIONAL DOCTRINE,
HOSTILITY AND ANTAGONISM.

THE SOVIET UNION MUST REALIZE THAT IT CANNOT HAVE IT
BOTH WAYS: THE ADVANTAGES OF GOOD STATE-TO STATE
RELATIONS CANNOT GO HAND-IN-HAND WITH AN ACTIVE POLICY
OF SUBVERSION IN THE NAME OF IDEOLOGY. NON-INTERFERENCE
CANNOT BE INTERPRETED IN ONE WAY FOR THE COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES AND IN ANOTHER FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD.
NATIONAL LIBERATION MAY NOT BE DEFINED ON A CLASS BASIS
FOR A WESTERN OR THIRD WORLD COUNTRY UNLESS THIS BASIS
IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN
EUROPE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ALL NATO CAPITALS.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN OSLO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 13032

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ALL NATO CAPITALS

THE FICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM MUST NOT BE ACCEPTED, AND NATO MUST FACE THIS CHALLENGE. WE CANNOT AGREE THAT THERE ARE TWO ORDERS OR POLITICAL LIFE OR TWO DIFFERENT SETS OF RULES. THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE SAID THAT DETENTE CREATES THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY OF LENINISM. WE MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FROM OUR STANDPOINT IT PROVIDES THE STRUCTURE FOR FINDING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM OUR DIFFERING IDEOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS. THE WEST MUST INSIST THAT IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AND THE CLASS WAR CONFLICT WITH WHAT WE REALLY SAID IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ONLY THEN WILL SOVIET LEADERS BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THEIR HARD-LINERS THAT THEIR COUNTRY'S INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY A UNILATERAL INTERPRETATION OF DETENTE THAT SAYS: "WHAT'S MINE IS MINE AND WHAT'S YOURS IS NEGOTIABLE."

3. REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS REGARDING ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AGREED WITH THE US ANALYSIS AND PARTICULARLY THE SECRETARY'S ADVICE THAT THE WEST MUST HAVE THE WILL TO MASTER ITS DESTINY. GENSCHER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN NATO'S ABILITY TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY. REALITY SHOULD NOT BE PAINTED IN PINK HUES. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES

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SHOULD NOT REMAIN SILENT ABOUT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION, GENSCHER CITED: 1) US DECISION TO ASSIGN TWO ADDITIONAL COMBAT BRIGADES; 2) CANADIAN EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES IN GERMANY, AND 3) THE RECENT FRENCH DECISION TO BUILD UP THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HOWEVER, PROBLEMS REMAIN ON THE FLANKS, REQUIRING CONTINUED ALLIED ATTENTION.

GENSCHER CAUTIONED ABOUT CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS IN PUBLIC OPINION OVER DETENTE. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE DETENTE POLICY THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING. A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR PERIOD IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. THE ALLIES MUST CONTINUE -- WITHIN CSCE AND IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE EAST -- TO MAKE DETENTE POLICY WORK, E.G., AS IN FRG EFFORTS WITH POLAND. THE ALLIES MUST CREATE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THIS POLICY. AT THE SAME TIME, GENSCHER CAUTIONED AGAINST CREATING ILLUSIONS REGARDING RAPID PROGRESS IN DETENTE. SOVIET MOVES TO EXPLOIT THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN ARE REVEALING IN THIS RESPECT.

ALLIED CITIZENRY MUST UNDERSTAND THE MILITARY NECESSITIES OF MAINTAINING THE EQUILIBRIUM IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AN EQUILIBRIUM WHICH MUST NOT BE AFFECTED BY INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS OR MBFR. GENSCHER FORESAY NO PROGRESS IN MBFR OVER THE COMING MONTHS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, FOR THE WEST TO RECONFIRM ITS OBJECTIVES. THE EAST MUST ACCOMMODATE THE WEST. POLITICAL DETENTE SHOULD LEAD TO MILITARY DETENTE; THE OPPOSITE SEEMS TO BE HAPPENING.

SOVIET EFFORTS TO BUILD UP ITS FORCES ARE BASED ON DECISIONS TAKEN YEARS AGO. THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH BEYOND THEIR NECESSITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND SEEK SUPREMACY AT SEA. SUCH MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS ARE BOUND TO HAVE POLITICAL EFFECTS. THE ANGOLA EXPERIENCE AND THE AFRICAN REACTION THERETO TESTIFY TO THIS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THIS REALITY IN THE MBFR
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CONTEXT AND INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY ALLIES. WHETHER NATO IS AFFECTED BY EVENTS OUTSIDE ITS SPHERE OF COMPETENCE IS FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, GENSCHER BELIEVES THAT NATO'S POSSIBILITIES DEPEND ON BOTY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS. THUS, EVENTS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST DO AFFECT THE ALLIANCE. AS FOR INTERNAL EVENTS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY MUST BE SOUGHT. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MUST SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS SO AS TO CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO THE STRENGTH AND STABILITY OF THE WEST.

IN SUM, NATO IS FACED WITH: A) INCREASED ARMAMENTS ON THE EASTERN SIDE; B) SOVIET DETERMINATION TO INCREASE ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE; C) SOVIET OBJECTIVE TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE INTO THE THIRD WORLD. IN SHORT, THE SOVIETS SEEK A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF POWER. IN RESPONSE, THE ALLIANCE MUST OFFER: A) MILITARY BALANCE; B) THE POLITICAL WILL TO COPE WITH THE CHALLENGE; C) THE PURSUIT OF DETENTE TO DEFUSE CRISIS SITUATIONS. ALTHOUGH NATO IS A REGIONAL ALLIANCE, IT MUST MAKE THE EAST REALIZE THAT DETENTE WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR ACTIONS IN OTHER REGIONS. THE SOVIETS MUST UNDERSTAND THE LIMITATIONS OF DETENTE. GENSCHER CONCLUDED WITH THE HOPE THAT THIS MINISTERIAL MEETING GIVES NEW IMPETUS TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION.

KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED NATO CAPITALS.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECTO, ALLIANCE, SPEECHES, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 MAY 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SECTO13032
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760197-0389
From: SECRETARY OSLO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760528/aaaaaxlz.tel
Line Count: 277
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 AUG 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <16 APR 2004 by CollinP0, 3.4.X9, REFER TO NATO>; RELEASED <23 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <24 AUG 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO MINISTERIAL: RESTRICTED SESSION, MORNING, MAY 20, 1976
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, CA, US, GE, NATO, NAC, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (GENSCHER, HANS-DIETRICH), (MACEACHEN, ALLAN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006